

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 DODE-00 ACDA-10 INR-05

CIAE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 L-01 SAJ-01 SP-02 PRS-01

/054 W

----- 103781

R 121712Z MAY 75

FM US MISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2844

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

US MISSION NATO 3132

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 3444

LIMDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECDEF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM'S PARAMETERS FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF  
MANEUVERS

1. SUMMARY: DURING RECENT ROUND OF SUBCOMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS  
ON CBM ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS, SOVIETS AND THEIR  
WARSAW PACK ALLIES HAVE MADE ONE MEANINGFUL CONCESSION ON  
AREA OF APPLICATION, HINTED AT A CONCESSION ON TIMING OF  
NOTIFICATION, AND TAKEN A LIMITED STEP FORWARD ON QUESTION  
OF SIZE OF MANEUVERS TO BE NOTIFIED (I.E., "THRESHOLD").  
ALLIES IN TURN HAVE AGREED ON ACCEPTABLE COUNTERMOVES TO  
SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON AREA, TIMING, AND THRESHOLD ISSUES,  
AND WILL PROBABLY INTRODUCE THESE NEGOTIATING CONCESSIONS  
IN NEXT SUBCOMMITTEE ROUND ON MANEUVERS MEASURE, WHICH  
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BEGINS MAY 14. FOLLOWING REPORTS STATE OF PLAY ON EACH OF

THE THREE "NUMERICAL" PARAMETERS, BASED ON SUB-COMMITTEE AND CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS, AND ON PRIVILEGED (NOFORN) EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET REPS ON MAY 9. END SUMMARY.

2. AREA: MOST IMPORTANT CBM CONCESSION SOVIETS HAVE MADE IN RECENT MONTHS HAS BEEN TO ACCEPT APPLICATION OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS IN ALL TERRITORY OF EUROPEAN STATES, INCLUDING WARSAW PACT STATES WHERE SOVIET FORCES ARE STATIONED, AND EXCEPTING ONLY INTERIOR PORTIONS BEHIND FRONTIER ZONES OF EUROPEAN USSR, AND, IF NECESSARY TURKEY. OTHER PACT PARTICIPANTS ARE STILL FORMALLY RESERVING ON THIS NEW SOVIET CONCESSION, PRESUMABLY AS A HEDGE TO ENSURE THAT WEST CONTINUES TO MOVE TOWARDS "VOLUNTARY BASIS" FOR MANEUVER CBM. HOWEVER, POLAND IS IN FACT THE ONLY WARSAW PACT STATE THAT WOULD HAVE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL EXCLUDED PORTION OF TERRITORY IF SOVIET BORDER ZONE CONCEPT HAD BEEN RETAINED, AND ROMANIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT POLES ARE PRIVATELY PLEASED WITH PROSPECT THAT THEY TOO MAY NOW EXPECT TO BE NOTIFIED OF MAJOR SOVIET MANEUVERS ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY.

3. WHILE SOVIETS HAVE THEMSELVES NOW CONCEDED APPLICATION OF MEASURE IN ALL OF NON-SOVIET EUROPE, THEY HAVE AT SAME TIME REAFFIRMED POSITION ON LIMITATION OF MEASURE TO 100-KMS OF SOVIET BORDER TERRITORY. ALLIES IN CONTRAST INTRODUCED FIGURE OF 700 KMS LAST DECEMBER FOR DESIRED DEPTH OF BAND OF SOVIET TERRITORY, AND HAVE MAINTAINED THIS VIEW IN SUBCOMMITTEE SINCE THEN. ALLIES IN FACT HAVE HAD INTERNALLY AGREED LATITUDE FOR SOME TIME TO FALL OFF THIS POSITION AND PROPOSE A 500-KM BAND OF TERRITORY, AND WILL PROBABLY MAKE THIS CONCESSION SOON. MOREOVER, MANY ALLIES WONDER IF NATO POSITION COULD NOT BE FURTHER SOFTENED, BEARING IN MIND ESTIMATES SUBMITTED IN NATO BY UK AND NATO MILITARY STAFF ASSESSMENT THAT A MERE 100-KMS WOULD COVER A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF SOVIET-WESTERN MANEUVERS, AND WOULD PERHAPS MEET ALLIED NEEDS FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT (US NATO 1854). DURING CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE OF MAY 6, U.S. REP (AS RESULT OF WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS) SAID US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DOES NOT HAVE BASIS TO CORROBORATE DETAILED UK ESTIMATES; A JUDGEMENT THAT THREE QUARTERS OF SOVIET MANEUVERS IN BORDER DISTRICTS TAKE PLACE WITHIN 100-KMS OF FRONTIER COULD CONCEIVABLY BE BASED ON FACT THAT A HIGH

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PERCENTAGE OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS IN LENINGRAD AND CAUCASUS MILITARY REGIONS ARE WITHIN 100-KMS OF FRONTIERS OR SEA COASTS, AND ABOUT HALF OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS IN WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS ARE SIMILARLY WITHIN 100-KMS OF FRONTIERS, BUT THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE MUCH HARD EVIDENCE BEYOND THIS AS TO WHERE SPECIFIC GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS TAKE PLACE IN USSR.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, UK ESTIMATES DO SEEM TO BE GIVEN

SOME CREDENCE BY BULGARIAN STATEMENTS TO SEVERAL DIFFERENT NATO REPS THAT "OUR" MANEUVERS (I.E. WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS, INCLUDING SOVIET MANEUVERS) ARE AS A RULE CONDUCTED NEAR FRONTIERS. BULGARIAN REP EXPLAINED THAT MANEUVERS ARE CONDUCTED IN FORWARD AREAS SO AS TO FAMILIARIZE TROOPS WITH TERRAIN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO DEFEND IN INITIAL ENGAGEMENTS.

5. WITHOUT ATTRIBUTING THIS SOURCE, US REP INQUIRED WITH SOVIET REPS IN PRIVATE BILATERAL CONVERSATION ON MAY 9 WHETHER CORRIDOR REPORTS WERE TRUE THAT MOST SOVIET MANEUVERS IN WESTERN AREAS WERE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT QUITE CLOSE TO FRONTIERS, POINTING OUT THAT ANY GENERAL REASSURANCES SOVIETS COULD GIVE TO THIS EFFECT MIGHT ENHANCE WESTERN RECEPTIVENESS TO IDEA OF CONCESSIONS ON DEPTH OF ZONE OF SOVIET TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER HAND, US REP REITERATED THAT 100-KMS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE FIGURE IN EYES OF ANY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING US. SOVIET REPS AGREED TO REFLECT ON QUESTION.

6. ASIDE FROM ISSUE OF DEPTH OF BORDER ZONE, SOVIETS HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR IN SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THEY DO NOT ACCEPT CONCEPT OF MEASURING BORDER ZONES FROM THEIR COASTAL FRONTIERS, BUT RATHER ONLY FROM THEIR FRONTIERS WITH OTHER CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES. SOVIET DRAFT TEXT FOR ZONE OF APPLICATION, INTRODUCED ON APRIL 28 IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE: IN CASE THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING STATE EXTENDS BEYOND EUROPE, PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE APPLICABLE ONLY FOR MANOEUVRES WHICH TAKE PLACE WITHIN 100 KM FROM THE TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER EUROPEAN PARTICIPATING STATE. END QUOTE. THIS SOVIET CONFIDENTIAL

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ATTEMPT TO EXCLUDE FRONTIER ZONES ALONG SEACOASTS OF BLACK SEA AND BALTIC FROM APPLICATION OF MEASURE IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN ONLY TO TURKEY AMONG ALLIES AND SWEDEN AMONG NEUTRALS, BUT OTHERS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THEM IN PRESSING FOR MEASUREMENT OF COASTAL ZONE FROM COASTS AS WELL AS FROM FRONTIERS OF OTHER STATES.

7. IN MAY 9 CONVERSATION, US REP RECALLED TO SOVIETS THAT AMBASSADOR MENDELEVITCH HAD MENTIONED IN APRIL 17 MEETING THAT SOVIET BORDER BAND WOULD BE 3,500-KMS LONG, AND ASKED HOW SOVIETS HAD COME UP WITH THIS FIGURE. SOVIETS REPLIED THAT THIS FIGURE WAS MERELY A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THE LENGTH OF SOVIET BORDERS WITH OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS. US REP POINTED OUT CERTAIN TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH MEASUREMENT OF ZONES FROM LAND

FRONTIERS ONLY, BUT DID NOT PURSUE THEM, AND AGREED  
TO DISCUSS ISSUE WITH SOVIETS ON SUBSEQUENT OCCASION.

8. THRESHOLD: DURING SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS IN WEEK OF  
APRIL 28, CZECH AND GDR REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSED SETTLING  
THRESHOLD FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AT 40,000 TROOPS FOR  
THOSE STATES NOT HAVING ARMY CORPS UNITS. WARSAW PACT REPS  
HAVE EXPLAINED INFORMALLY THAT THIS FIGURE SHOULD BE SEEN AS  
A RESPONSE TO PERSISTENT ALLIED/NEUTRAL PROMPTING TO NAME A  
GENERAL FIGURE FOR THE SIZE OF AN "ARMY CORPS". AT AN AP-  
PROPRIATE TIME, ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO PACT MOVES  
ON THRESHOLD BY RAISING MINIMUM SIZE OF MANEUVERS TO BE NOTIFIED  
FROM 12,000 TO 15-16,000 TROOPS.

9. AS REPORTED GENEVA 2633, DATA UNCERTAINTIES MAKE IT  
DIFFICULT FOR ALLIES TO JUDGE WHAT EFFECTS OF VARIOUS  
THRESHOLDS WOULD BE IN TERMS OF ACTUAL NUMBERS OF MANEU-  
VERS THAT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED EITHER BY NATO ALLIANCE  
OR BY PACT IN A GIVEN YEAR, AND ALLIES WILL BE RE-  
LUCTANT TO RAISE THRESHOLD SUBSTANTIALLY WITHOUT A  
BETTER IDEA OF PROBABLE RESULTS. A THRESHOLD WHICH  
CUTS OFF VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED MANEUVERS FROM OBLIGATORY  
NOTIFICATION AND STILL OBLIGATES WARSAW PACT TO NOTIFY  
A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF MAJOR MANEUVERS MIGHT NOT BE  
THE MOST DESIRABLE OUTCOME, BECAUSE IT WOULD EXPOSE  
ALLIES TO CHARGE OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

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10. DURING MAY 9 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIETS, US REP  
MADE REFERENCE TO CZECH PROPOSAL FOR THRESHOLD AT  
40,000, AND NOTED THAT WE HAD ALSO HEARD FIGURES OF  
35,000 AND 30-35,000 IN EARLIER PRIVATE BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH  
SOVIETS.

11. US REP ALERTED SOVIETS TO FACT THAT THRESHOLD COULD  
BE A DIFFICULT PROBLEM, IF SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST  
ON SUCH A HIGH FIGURE, POINTING OUT THAT ANY THRESHOLD  
BEYOND THE LEVEL OF REINFORCED NATO DIVISION WOULD BE  
LIKELY TO RESULT IN VERY FEW, IF ANY ALLIED NOTIFICATIONS  
WHILE WARSAW PACT MIGHT STILL HAVE TO ANNOUNCE MANY  
MANEUVERS. SOVIETS REPLIED THAT REINFORCED DIVISION  
CRITERION WOULD "NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE" SINCE IT WOULD  
REQUIRE AN "EXCESSIVE" NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS. SOVIETS  
WERE, HOWEVER, STILL THINKING OF THRESHOLD ISSUE, AND  
THEIR ULTIMATE DECISION ON WHERE THE THRESHOLD SHOULD  
BE SET WOULD DEPEND ON SOME EXTENT ON RESOLUTION OF  
AREA QUESTION.

12. TIMING: AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, SOVIETS IN MAY

5 SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING APPEARED TO HINT THEY COULD RAISE TIME OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION FROM 10 TO 13-14 DAYS. WHEN ASKED TO CLARIFY THIS STATEMENT IN PRIVATE MEETING ON MAY 9, SOVIETS SAID THAT PLANNING FOR SOVIET MANEUVERS IS USUALLY COMPLETED ABOUT TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE MANEUVERS THEMSELVES, BUT THAT NOTIFICATION EXACTLY 14 DAYS IN ADVANCE WOULD STILL BE DIFFICULT FOR TECHNICAL REASONS. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE AGREED CSCE TEXT SHOULD READ "AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN ADVANCE" BUT IT MIGHT, IN FACT, BE POSSIBLE FOR SOVIETS TO NOTIFY 11-13 DAYS IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER, SOVIETS ADDED THAT THIS QUESTION TOO WAS "STILL UNDER STUDY." ABRAMS

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** COLLECTIVE SECURITY, CBMS, NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY EXERCISES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 MAY 1975  
**Decapton Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decapton Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975GENEVA03444  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750166-0304  
**From:** GENEVA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Line Count:** 235  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 08 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <08 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <09 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CSCE: CBM'S PARAMETERS FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS  
**TAGS:** MARR, PFOR, PARM, XG, US, CSCE  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006